Court of Appeal: Certificate of murder conviction admissible in inheritance proceedings

A woman who was found guilty of the murder of her husband has lost an appeal against the finding that her certificate of conviction for the murder was admissible as evidence to preclude her from inheriting his estate.

The woman argued that the certificate was hearsay and could therefore not be admitted in inheritance proceedings brought by the victim’s family; however the Court of Appeal found that it was admissible as prima facie proof that the woman murdered her husband, and also as a public document.

Background

On the 11th April 2000, following a trial of 42 days before a judge and jury in the Central Criminal Court, Ms Catherine Nevin was found guilty of:

  1. Murder, contrary to common law and s. 4 of the Criminal Justice Act 1964 and s. 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1990 of Thomas Nevin at Jack White’s Inn aforesaid;
  2. soliciting to murder, contrary to s. 4 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, one John Jones to murder Thomas Nevin;
  3. soliciting to murder contrary to s. 4 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, one Jerry Heapes, to murder Thomas Nevin;
  4. soliciting to murder, contrary to s. 4 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, one William McClean to murder Thomas Nevin.
  5. The proceedings before the Court of Appeal sought declarations at common law and pursuant to s. 120 of the Succession Act 1965 that Ms Nevin was “precluded taking any share either as legal right or otherwise in the Estate of the said Deceased”. The proceedings were commenced initially by the Thomas Nevin’s mother, and subsequent to her death were continued by his two siblings; Mr Patrick Nevin and Ms Margaret Lavelle.

    High Court

    In March 2013 the High Court determined that “the conviction of for her husband’s murder is admissible in the within proceedings as prima facie evidence of the fact that she committed such murder”.

    President of the High Court Mr Justice Nicholas Kearns, considered the law in this jurisdiction to be that as stated by Sir Samuel Evans in his judgment in Crippen (In the estate of Cunigunda (otherwise Cora) Crippen deceased) , where he said:

    “In my opinion, where a convicted felon, or the personal representative of a convicted murderer who has been executed, brings any civil proceeding to establish claims, or to enforce rights, which result to the felon, or to the convicted testator from his own crime, the conviction is admissible in evidence, not merely as proof of the conviction, but also as presumptive proof of the commission of the crime.”

    Court of Appeal

    The core issue for the Court of Appeal was whether President Kearns was correct in his finding that the conviction of Ms Nevin was admissible “as prima facie evidence that Catherine Nevin murdered her husband”.

    In their separate judgments, both Mr Justice John Hedigan and Ms Justice Finlay Geoghegan were satisfied that in Crippen (In the estate of Cunigunda (otherwise Cora) Crippen deceased) , insofar as the issue of admissibility of the conviction for murder goes, the statement of Sir Samuel Evans in this case was obiter dictum, and President Kearns was therefore incorrect to rely on this.

    However, Justice Hedigan was compelled by the 1969 New Zealand Court of Appeal finding in orgensen v. News Media (Auckland) Limited NZLR 961, in which it was stated:

    “In the present case, on the other hand, there is already a body of judicial opinion that would justify the conclusion that a certificate of conviction is not merely conclusive evidence that Jorgensen had been found guilty of the murder of Speight but was admissible evidence as well in proof of the fact of guilt and that is as far as I feel obliged to go.”

    Justice Hedigan adopted the logic of the Court of Appeal of New Zealand in Jorgensen; thus the certificate of conviction of Ms Nevin for the murder of her husband was admissible even though it was technically hearsay.

    Public Document

    As to the admission in evidence of public documents at common law, Justice Hedigan agreed with the requirement as set out in Declan McGrath, Evidence 2nd Ed., (Dublin, 2014) at p. 323, stating that:

    “…in general terms, to be admissible under this exception, a document must:

    1. contain matters of a public nature;
    2. have been compiled by a public official in the exercise of a duty to inquire into and record those matters; and
    3. have been intended to be retained for and be available for public inspection.”
    4. Justice Hedigan stated that in Ms Nevin’s case, a certificate of conviction clearly contains matters of a public nature, has been prepared by the trial court’s Registrar who is a public official exercising a duty to record the conviction, and was intended to be retained for and be available for public inspection.

      As such, the certificate was also admissible at common law as a public document.

      While finding that it was unnecessary to address the wording of s. 120(1) of the Succession Act 1965 as opposed to section 120(4); Justice Hedigan stated that “it would be desirable that the apparent anomaly therein be dealt with by way of an amendment”.

      Conclusion

      The three-judge Court of Appeal concurred that the certificate of conviction was admissible “at least as prima facie proof” that Ms Nevin murdered her husband; and moreover that it was “also admissible at common law as a public document”.

      • by Seosamh Gráinséir for Irish Legal News
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