Court of Appeal: Ryanair not entitled to better particulars from pilot in defamation proceedings

About this case:

• Judgment:
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Affirming the decision of the High Court, Mr Justice Gerard Hogan ruled that it would be unfair to require the pilot to plead to such a high level of particularity in advance of discovery, as the particulars already supplied were enough to give Ryanair a broad outline of the case it would have to meet.

Background

In August 2013 the British television channel, Channel 4, broadcast a programme entitled “Dispatches: Secrets from the Cockpit” in which it claimed that Ryanair had compromised passenger safety in a number of respects.

Mr John Goss, a Ryanair pilot at the time of Channel 4’s filming, had been interviewed by the Channel 4 team and excerpts from that interview were broadcast in the Dispatches programme. Mr Goss was dismissed by Ryanair two days after the broadcast of the programme, and Ryanair commenced the ongoing defamation proceedings on 22nd August 2013.

The High Court

In advance of discovery, Ryanair was dissatisfied with Mr Goss’s response to its requests for further and better particulars and it issued a motion on 19th January 2015 seeking an order compelling a response to its notice for further and better particulars.

At the hearing in the High Court the outstanding issues were reduced to two specific requests for further and better particulars.

In its statement of claim Ryanair gave particulars of alleged defamatory comments, including a claim that the programme had stated or implied that the IAA “is turning a blind eye to safety issues in Ryanair” and that safety issues at Ryanair “are being ignored and overlooked by aviation authorities.”

In relation to these specific particulars, Mr Goss pleaded that these allegations were true in fact and in substance for the purposes of s. 16 of the Defamation Act 2009; and Mr Goss specifically gave particulars of the material facts upon which he intends to rely at trial by way of support of this plea.

These particulars included a plea that he had submitted confidential reports to the IAA in 2006 and 2007 and that the issues raised by him “in these reports included the operational effects of aggressive management behaviour” and simultaneous refuelling and boarding.

In relation to the particulars of material fact supplied by Mr Goss in its defence regarding the allegations of inaction by the IAA, Mr Goss contended, inter alia, that he “and other pilots working for Ryanair, have made reports to the IAA and received no substantive response from the said Authority.”

Aggressive management behaviour

The first of the two disputed particulars discussed in the High Court, was a particular which sought details of the “instances of aggressive management behaviour on the part of Ryanair which Mr Goss intends to reply upon.”

Counsel for Mr Goss clarified that all the instances of alleged aggressive management behaviour upon which Mr Goss relies are contained in the reports made by him to the IAA; copies of which had already been supplied to Ryanair

In the course of the proceedings, counsel for Ryanair accepted that the claim was adequately particularised and it was therefore unnecessary for Justice Hogan to consider this further.

Other complaints made by Ryanair pilots to the IAA

The second particular related to details of other similar complaints allegedly made by other Ryanair pilots to the IAA in respect of which it is alleged they have not received any substantive response.

Justice Hogan said the “classic test regarding object of particulars remains that as articulated by Henchy J. in Cooney v. Browne IR 185”,

“Where particulars are sought for the purposes of delivering a pleading, they should not be ordered unless they can be said to be necessary or desirable to enable the party seeking them to plead, or for some other special reason: see Ord. 19, r. 6(3). Where the particulars are sought for the purpose of a hearing, they should not be ordered unless they are necessary or desirable for the purpose of a fair hearing….Thus, where the pleading in question is so general or so imprecise that the other side cannot know what case he will have to meet at the trial, he should be entitled to such particulars as will inform him of the range of evidence (as distinct from any particular items of evidence) which he will have to deal with at the trial.”

Accordingly, “particulars will be ordered in the interests of fair procedures and to ensure that a litigant will not be surprised by the nature of the case which he has to meet”. Justice Hogan considered the leading cases on the topic and stated that this was essentially the governing principle in all cases where the issue of whether the particulars should be ordered. By these standards, Justice Hogan was satisfied that Ryanair was aware in broad terms the case it would have to meet

The fact that, if additional details were supplied by way of particulars, this would be likely to assist Ryanair in the subsequent conduct of the litigation was not in itself a reason to order further particulars if the particulars already supplied to Ryanair enabled it to know in broad outline the case it will have to meet; and it would be generally unfair to require a defendant to plead to such a high level of particularity in advance of discovery (as per Thema International Fund plc v. HSBC Institutional Trust Services (Ireland) IESC 19).

Conclusions

Dismissing the appeal, Justice Hogan affirmed the decision of the High Court to refuse to make an order directing Mr Goss to answer the disputed two particulars.