Court of Appeal upholds €85,000 award made to former premier league footballer in Sunday World defamation case

About this case:

• Judgment:
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In April 2011, the newspaper published two articles about the footballer’s alleged contact with known criminals, one of which was adjudged to be defamatory by a jury in the High Court.

Dismissing the appeal, Mr Justice Gerard Hogan found that there had been no breach of the single meaning rule, nor had the jury been prevented from properly considering the newspapers’ defence under section 16(2) of the Defamation Act 2009. Accordingly, the newspaper had failed to establish any basis for the Court of Appeal to interfere with the award.

Background

The Court heard that after retiring from professional football, Mr Speedie moved from the UK to Dublin to be with his then fiancée, Ms Grey. Ms Grey’s sister was in turn married to the brother of a notorious criminal figure.

In 2011 Mr Speedie issued defamation proceedings against Sunday Newspapers Ltd following the publication of two articles in The Sunday World in April 2011.

Article 1 described how Mr Speedie had been stopped by Gardaí on a number of occasions and how his relationship with Ms Grey had brought him into contact with known criminals.

Article 2 was headed “Speedie the Snake” and referred to the fact that Mr Speedie had caused a solicitor’s letter to be written to the newspaper claiming that he had been defamed by Article 1.

Defamation proceedings

In the High Court, Mr Speedie complained that the newspaper had alleged either that he was engaged in criminal activity or that the Gardaí had reason to believe that he was involved in gangland crime, and that both Article 1 and Article 2 bore these meanings.

The newspaper denied that the articles in question bore the meaning that Mr Speedie had been involved in crime or that he had been wanted for questioning by the Gardaí.

The libel action took five days before Justice Hedigan, and “following a lengthy discussion and submissions from counsel for both sides, an issue paper with eight questions was agreed”.

The jury’s verdict was to the effect that Article 1 meant that Mr Speedie had been reasonably suspected of involvement in criminal activities, and thus he was entitled to €85,000 damages for defamation.

The jury further found that the allegations contained in Article 2 to the effect that Mr Speedie had associated with known criminals and that he was treacherous as a snake were true in substance.

Court of Appeal

The newspaper appealed the jury’s verdict to the Court of Appeal, arguing that there was a mistrial in that the jury verdict was inconsistent, and the trial judge had infringed the “single meaning” rule by allowing Question 2 (Garda suspicion of involvement in criminal activity) and Question 4 (associating with known criminals) both to go to the jury.

The single meaning rule

In defamation proceedings the Court must settle on a single meaning to be ascribed to the relevant words of a particular, discrete charge contained in the publication in question.

As explained in Yeo v. Times Newspapers Ltd. EHC 2853; this does not mean that one article may not contain more than one defamatory meaning.

According to Justice Hogan, “the real object of the single meaning rule is to promote certainty so far as the parties are concerned by fixing on one, single objectively determined meaning to the relevant words of a particular article and thereby to avoid the possibility of inconsistent verdicts”.

Justice Hogan stated that two distinct allegations were made by different words in Article 1 (suspicion of involvement in crime, and associating with known criminals); thus it was “perfectly possible to conclude that Article 1 carried these two imputations and that one was true while the other was false”.

Thus the Court was satisfied that the single meaning rule had not been breached.

Section 16 of the Defamation Act 2009

The other objection raised by the newspaper was that the sequence of the questions on the issue paper prevented the jury from properly considering the scope of the newspaper’s s. 16(2) defence.

However, Justice Hogan pointed out that no objection was taken to the sequence of the questions on the issue paper and nor was s. 16(2) itself raised as a specific question for the issue paper.

The first time that s. 16(2) was raised in terms at this point in the trial was following a question from the jury in respect of Questions 4 to 7 some three hours into their deliberations – “but by that stage it was too late to undo the manner in which the issues had been formulated, closing speeches made, and the issue paper entrusted into the hands of the jury”.

Accordingly, Justice Hogan said “the newspaper must be adjudged to have waived its right to raise the s. 16(2) defence” in relation to the meaning alleged (and disputed) that the Gardaí suspected Mr Speedie of involvement in crime.

Conclusion

Dismissing the appeal, Justice Hogan stated that in all the circumstances, there was no basis upon which the amount of the jury’s award of €85,000 should be interfered with.