About this case:

• Citation:
  [2025] IEHC 48
• Judgment:
  External link
• Court:
  High Court
• Judge:
  Mr Justice Barry O'Donnell

Delivering judgment for the High Court, Mr Justice Barry O’Donnell highlighted that “while the court clearly is not entitled to draw on the evidence that was given in other cases to make findings of fact in this appeal, it is entitled to have some regard to the fact that the plaintiff gave the evidence in those other cases but not in this appeal, despite the fact that the defendants have endeavoured to put the transactions and their effect in issue”.

Background

In 2007, GE Capital Woodchester Home Loans Ltd provided to the defendants a loan in the sum of €200,000, which was secured by way of a charge in favour of GE Capital over a property in Coolock, Co Dublin. 

In 2012, GE Capital changed its name to Pepper Finance Corporation (Ireland) Ltd, which later converted to a designated activity company pursuant to the Companies Act 2014.

The defendants defaulted on the repayment of the loan, leading to Pepper issuing possession proceedings in respect of the defendants’ home. On 21 February 2024, the Circuit Court made an order for possession pursuant to s.67 of the Registration of Title Act 1964.

The defendants appealed against the order, contending inter alia that the plaintiff did not own the charge in circumstances where an article claimed that GE Capital sold its Irish residential mortgage portfolio to a special purpose vehicle and where letters sent by him seeking clarification of the ownership of the charge had not been responded to.

The defendants thus asserted that the plaintiff had not proved that it was entitled to the underlying debt when the demand for repayment was made and that the case should be adjourned to plenary hearing.

The plaintiff did not respond to the affidavits sworn by the first defendant, submitting that the issues were straightforward and fell to be determined by reference to the well-established principles set out in the case law relating to applications pursuant to s.62(7) of the 1964 Act.

The High Court

Mr Justice O’Donnell considered that the evidence tendered on part of the defendants was “sparse and somewhat speculative”, but showed that the first defendant sought clarification from the plaintiff as to the ownership of the charge over the property and that the plaintiff made no substantive reply and declined to address the issue by way of a replying affidavit.

The court considered the decisions in Pepper Finance Corporation (Ireland) DAC v Moynihan [2024] IEHC 625 and in Pepper Finance Corporation (Ireland) DAC v Moloney [2023] IECA 161, in which Pepper adduced evidence of the transactions that gave rise to the issues agitated by the defendant.

Finding that Moloney clearly supported the position of the plaintiff as to its ownership of the registered charge over the property, Mr Justice O’Donnell noted that the judgment did not address the question of how the High Court should dispose of the appeal before it.

The judge highlighted that it was “entirely understandable that the defendants, particularly as litigants in person, would be perplexed that the plaintiff has been recorded as having provided evidence relating to a particular transaction or set of transactions in a number of publicly available decisions of the High Court and Court of Appeal” but did not advert to those matters in their case.

Remarking that each case must be determined by reference to the evidence adduced in that particular case, the High Court relied upon Moloney in stating that “a litigant in one set of proceedings cannot rely on evidence of facts that are reported as having been given in other separate proceedings to which he was not a party”. 

The court continued: “As such, it is not open to the defendants in this appeal to rely on Moynihan, or the other cases, as evidence of the fact that the plaintiff entered into particular transactions or of the nature of the transactions or their legal effect, where no evidence was adduced in respect of those transactions in this appeal.” 

However, the court pointed out that the proceedings before it were adversarial and that each party was entitled to adduce evidence to prove or to refute factual propositions, and that while the court could not draw on evidence given in other cases to make findings of fact on appeal, it could be inferred that Pepper had deliberately declined to place evidence before the court in relation to the issues raised by the defendants.

In this regard, the court determined that the defendants raised issues which could have been addressed by the plaintiff, and that in circumstances where the evidence of those transactions was in the control of the plaintiff and not generally available, those issues ought to have been addressed.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the High Court made an order remitting the proceedings for plenary hearing.

Pepper Finance Corporation (Ireland) DAC v Meredith & Anor [2025] IEHC 48