High Court: Service of personal injury proceedings on Rihanna deemed good

A woman who commenced personal injury proceedings against singer Rihanna has been granted an order deeming the service of the summons good.

While Ms Justice Miriam O’Regan was not satisfied that there was valid service as a matter of New York law or US federal law; she held that the service actually effected should be deemed good in accordance with Order 9, Rule 15 of the Rules of the Superior Courts because, among other reasons; receipt of the documents via Rihanna’s concierge was not denied, and personal service upon Rihanna was not practically available to the plaintiff.

Background

In July 2015, Ms Dana Kavanagh secured liberty to issue and serve a notice of a personal injury summons on Ms Robyn Fenty (also known as Rihanna) outside the jurisdiction at the her New York City address.

Summons server, Mr Mohammed Bouri filed two affidavits of service on behalf of Ms Kavanagh: the first stated that he served the personal injury summons on the concierge at Ms Fenty’s dwelling house in November 2015, and that he mailed a copy of the same in a post-paid envelope properly addressed to Ms Fenty by certified and first class mail; the second stated that he served the summons to a difference concierge in October 2016, and that in November 2015 he mailed the same by certified and first class mail. Justice O’Regan said that there were unexplained discrepancies at issue in the affidavits provided by Mr Bouri – notably regarding dates and whether postal service included certified post.

The Hague Convention

Article 10 of The Hague Convention states that, provided the destination State does not object, the Convention shall not interfere with the freedom to send judicial documents by postal channels directly to the person abroad.

The parties agreed that because of and in accordance with The Hague Convention, in order to establish proper service of the notice of summons on Ms Fenty, the plaintiff must show compliance with either:

  1. Federal rules which require delivery to the individual personally, or by leaving a copy at the individual’s dwelling or usual place of abode, with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there, or by delivering a copy of same to an agent authorised by appointment or by law to receive service of process, or;
  2. Under New York rules which require delivery of the summons to a person of suitable age and discretion at the actual place of abode of the person to be served and by mailing within 20 days of each other, the summons to the person to be served at his or her last known residence.
  3. Applications before the High Court

    Pursuant to Order 12, rule 26 of the Rules of the Superior Courts, an application was brought on behalf of Ms Fenty to set aside the purported service of the notice of the summons on the grounds that the purported service was invalid and ineffective.

    Ms Kavanagh sought an order deeming the service good.

    In the High Court, Justice O’Regan was satisfied on the evidence that Ms Fenty discharged the burden of proof that the summons should be set aside as there was no valid service effected as a matter of New York law or federal US law.

    Justice O’Regan then went on to consider whether the court should deem the service good.

    In this regard, Justice O’Regan explained that the purpose of the Hague Convention was to ensure that documents to be served abroad be brought to the notice of the addressee in sufficient time; and to improve judicial assistance by simplifying and expediting the procedure.

    Justice O’Regan deemed the service actually effected sufficient, in accordance with Order 9, Rule 15 of the Rules of the Superior Courts. Justice O’Regan also said that the provisions of Rules 8 and 9 of Order 11 were noteworthy.

    Justice O’Regan said that, in considering the granting of relied under Order 9 Rule 15 of the Rules of the Superior Courts, it was persuasive that:

    • In Heffernan v Ryan , sufficient service varied with the facts of each individual case
    • Ms Fenty had not disputed the existence of concierges in accordance with the descriptions averred by Mr Bouri
    • Ms Fenty’s manager, Ms Sarah Francus, did not deny receipt of the documents in November 2015
    • Effecting personal service or service on someone who resides at Ms Fenty’s residence was not practically available to Ms Kavanagh
    • Ms Fenty did not challenge Ms Kavanagh’s assertion of attending on a number of occasions in October 2016
      • by Seosamh Gráinséir for Irish Legal News
      • Copyright © Irish Legal News Ltd 2018

        Share icon
        Share this article: