About this case:

• Citation:
  [2025] IESC 12
• Judgment:
  External link
• Court:
  Supreme Court
• Judge:
  Ms Justice Iseult O'Malley

Delivering judgment for the Supreme Court, Ms Justice Iseult O’Malley considered that the interpretation adopted by the Supreme Court “is also the interpretation that is most consistent with the principles and policies of a statute that lays such heavy emphasis on the rehabilitation of persons who commit crimes during childhood. To borrow the language of s.158, the objective is to promote reintegration of child offenders into society ‘and prepare them to take their place in the community as persons who are capable of making a positive and productive contribution to society’.”

Background

On 16 January 2020, the appellant murdered Cameron Blair by inflicting a fatal injury with a knife. The defendant, then a few months short of his 18th birthday, pleaded guilty and was sentenced in April 2020, a month prior to attaining majority.

As of the date on which his sentence was imposed, the appellant was protected against the broadcasting of reports that would reveal his identity, pursuant to s.93 of the Children Act 2001 (as amended) which applies, as per s.93(1), to “proceedings before any court concerning a child”.

The appellant unsuccessfully appealed against the severity of the sentence and reached the age of 18 before the appeal was heard. That Court of Appeal affirmed the sentence imposed and found that because the appellant was no longer a child, s.93 had no further application.

The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court, with the only issue for determination being whether a defendant who was charged and brought before the courts as a child could remain entitled to the protection of s.93 if they reached the age of 18 before the criminal proceedings, including any appeal, concluded.

Submissions

The principal submission on behalf of the appellant was that  s.93(5) of the 2001 Act, which states that “this section shall apply in relation to proceedings on appeal” has the effect that the prohibition on identification continues into any appeal and could not be limited to cases where the accused remained under 18, as that situation would be covered by s.93(1) which relates to “proceedings before any court concerning a child”.

The respondent submitted inter alia that the section was plain and unambiguous and was not open to more than one interpretation, and that the legislature’s intent was to confine the section and the rest of the Act to children only.

The respondent further contended that the purpose of s.93(5) was merely to ensure clarity in the absence of any definition of “proceedings” and to safeguard against the possibility that s.93(1) could be interpreted as excluding appellate proceedings.

The notice party, the Attorney General, argued that on any view of its interpretation, s.93 is an exception to the principle that justice must be administered in public and so was required to be strictly construed, and that children’s rights inhere in children only, not in those who used to be children. 

The Supreme Court

Ms Justice O’Malley had regard to the statutory context as a whole and to applicable constitutional principles, observing that “the guarantees of fair procedures and equality may, in the cases involving child defendants, justifiably be implemented by way of trial procedures that are adapted to accommodate at least to some extent (without compromising the fundamental principles according to which a criminal trial is conducted) certain relevant features of childhood”.

The judge emphasised that there are several reasons why the law should extend particular protection to children, having regard to their vulnerability, their lesser culpability in respect of criminal behaviour, and their relatively greater prospect of rehabilitation when compared with adults.

Finding that those factors are “central features” of the modern criminal law as it relates to children and are reflected in the 2001 Act, Ms Justice O’Malley highlighted: “This does not mean that in a criminal prosecution the interests and welfare of a child defendant should necessarily take primacy over other interests… There is in each case the broad interest of society in the prosecution and punishment of crime.”

The court found it impossible to accept the argument put forward by the respondent and the Attorney General that the interpretation of s.93 was plain and obvious, finding that the meaning of “proceedings concerning a child” was “certainly” open to debate.

Considering the scope of s.93, the court determined that the section could not be construed as covering all forms of litigation and any case in which a child might be involved, such as a personal injuries action. However, the court was satisfied that the section is undoubtedly capable of applying to criminal trials and to appeals therefrom.

Turning to the temporal scope of the protection afforded by s.93, Ms Justice O’Malley opined that the view taken by the courts so far was that the protection lasts permanently if the proceedings conclude while the person is still a child, but last only until the day the person turns 18 if the proceedings are still in being.

The judge considered a number of alternative interpretations of s.93, finding that they did not accord with the statutory wording and objectives of the legislation, or the scheme of the 2001 Act. 

The court opined:

The court determined that the interpretation argued by the respondent and notice party, to the effect that the protection of s.93 expires if the person in question is still before the courts when they reach 18, was capable of creating an unjustifiable difference in the treatment of young persons engaged in the court process and had the potential to inhibit their rights of defence and appeal, consequences which could arise by pure happenstance.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court took the view that the proper construction of s.93 is that it applies when proceedings are commenced against a child, and continues to apply throughout those proceedings with its effects lasting beyond the conclusion of the proceedings in so far as any publication or report relates to the proceedings and is likely to identify the person who was “the child concerned in the proceedings”.

Ms Justice O’Malley was satisfied that this interpretation would have the effect of reducing the possibility of unequal and unfair treatment between young offenders and attempting to ensure that they are not subject to additional, unjustified and unnecessary pressure and harm in the criminal justice process, while also assisting with rehabilitation following its conclusion.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Supreme Court indicated that it would allow the appeal and would grant a declaration that s.93 of the 2001 Act applies to the appellant notwithstanding that he turned 18 during the currency of the criminal proceedings.

The court also indicated that it was minded to grant extensions of time within which persons in the position of the appellant, who had been sentenced to life in prison with a court review date and who had not challenged their sentence by way of appeal to the Supreme Court, could seek leave to appeal in light of findings made in a case heard jointly with his case, People (DPP) v. C.C. [2025] IESC 11.

Director of Public Prosecutions v. P.B. [2025] IESC 12