About this case:

• Citation:
  [2025] IESC 6
• Judgment:
  External link
• Court:
  Supreme Court
• Judge:
  Mr Justice Donal O'Donnell

Delivering judgment for the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Donal O’Donnell commented: “There are, it is said, only six degrees of separation between any two people and it is easy therefore to look for some links and connections particularly in a small jurisdiction. The fact that a judge may have relatives who are lawyers is not of itself suspect, still less presumptively corrupt.”

Background

The appeal before the Supreme Court arose from decades of litigation concerning the appellant’s unsuccessful application to University College Dublin (UCD) for admission to a Master’s course in 2001, in respect of which he claimed that he had been discriminated against on grounds of gender.

The appellant unsuccessfully sought the production of documents from UCD in his Circuit Court proceedings. This decision was upheld on appeal to the High Court by Mr Justice Charles Meenan, who was asked by the appellant to recuse himself on grounds of objective and subjective bias at the close of the hearing in circumstances where the appellant believed that the judge’s comments indicated his pre-determination of the application.

The appellant repeated this request when the matter came back before the High Court for the purpose of making final orders in respect of costs, asking the judge to recuse himself this time on grounds that the appellant had made a complaint to the Judicial Conduct Committee about him. Mr Justice Meenan refused and subsequently the appellant sought leave for a leapfrog appeal to the Supreme Court concerning EU law and bias.

The appellant raised two new matters which he believed to constitute bias — that Mr Justice Meenan’s son worked as a senior associate of Arthur Cox LLP, the firm on record for UCD, and that Mr Justice Meenan and two of his children had attended UCD.

The Supreme Court refused leave on the EU law point and the element of the bias claim relating to Mr Justice Meenan’s connection to UCD, but granted leave on the question of whether the fact of a judge’s close relative working as a solicitor in the firm representing a party could meet the test for objective bias. 

The Supreme Court

At the outset of his judgment, the Chief Justice noted: “The precise issue raised in this case is one which has arisen in a number of countries but has not yet been considered directly by any court in Ireland.”

The court emphasised that the application of the well-established ‘apprehension of bias’ test involves a two-stage process: “First, identification of what is said might lead the judge to decide a case other than on the legal and factual merits, (in this case the parental relationship) and second, the articulation of a cogent, rational and logical connection between that matter and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits.”

Confirming that Irish law had no rule of ‘automatic disqualification’ of judges as contended for by the appellant, the Supreme Court moved on to consider, inter alia, Kenny v Trinity College Dublin [2007] IESC 42, [2008] 2 IR 40. 

Having analysed the facts of Kenny, Chief Justice O’Donnell considered that at its highest, Kenny did not support the appellant’s claim where “it has always been recognised that it is not the relationship per se that disqualifies: it is the relationship having regard to the role played by the individual in the proceedings before the judge”.

The Chief Justice summarised a number of principles concerning the disqualification of judges from the hearing of a case, including that:

• The Guidelines do not determine the test for disqualification as a matter of law, but are relevant to the assessment of what is a reasonable and informed observer for the purpose of the objective bias test; 

• The same three-part objective test is applicable in every case: whether a reasonable observer would have a reasonable apprehension of bias;

• The test is strict and must be rigorously applied as “Too low a standard will damage, rather than promote, public confidence”;

• Other than a case in which a judge is (or is deemed) to be a party, there is no absolute rule of disqualification of a judge from hearing any case, even if a close relative is connected to a firm representing one of the parties;

• The apprehension necessary is akin to the standard of reasonable doubt: and must be reasoned and cogent;

• Objective bias is best understood as a reasonable apprehension that the case will not receive a fair and impartial hearing;

• The assessment of an apprehension of bias must give full weight to the declaration made by a judge under Article 34.6.1° and that such impartiality is central to the role which a judge accepts and holds themselves to; 

• It is necessary to show a rational, cogent and logical connection between a factor identified and the apprehension that the case will not receive a fair and impartial hearing;

• Disclosure or non-disclosure of a judge’s connections, if any, is not itself a separate test but may be a component in the overall analysis of the objective bias test.

Specifically in the context of cases where a judge and a lawyer are connected, the Chief Justice continued:

• A judge is disqualified from hearing a case in which a close relative actually represents a party whether as a solicitor or barrister in respect of the case.

• A ‘close relative’ in that context is defined in the Guidelines and in the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct to include a “spouse, civil partner, son, daughter, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, and any other close relative or person who is a companion or employee of the judge and who lives in the judge’s household”, with a judge’s spouse including “a domestic partner of the judge or any other person of either sex in a close personal relationship with the judge”.

• Where a close relative of a judge is employed in a firm acting for a party, the issue of disqualification can depend upon the particular facts of the case, the involvement of the relative, whether they have a direct and significant financial interest in the outcome, the degree of involvement with the lawyers actually engaged in the case, and the size of the firm;

• Where a close relative of a judge is employed in a large firm and where that firm represents a party, but the close relative has no involvement or financial interest in the case, a judge is not disqualified from hearing such a case;

• Disclosure of such a relationship in such circumstances is not required, and non-disclosure does not mean that a judge is disqualified from hearing the case;

• Where a judge is in doubt as to whether they should recuse themselves, or where that issue is raised after the fact or on appeal, a judge can provide a short statement in relation to the matter, but this is not an inter partes issue and a judge cannot be required to give evidence. The assessment of such a statement is a matter to be considered by that court or any appellate or reviewing court in determining the question of whether a judge ought to recuse themselves, or was disqualified from hearing a case.

Applying these principles to the facts, and having regard to the fact that Mr Justice Meenan’s son had no involvement or interest in, or connection with the case or its outcome, the Supreme Court determined that Mr Justice Meenan was not disqualified from hearing the case.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.

Patrick Kelly v University College Dublin & Anor [2025] IESC 6