About this case:

• Citation:
  [2025] IEHC 92
• Judgment:
  External link
• Court:
  High Court
• Judge:
  Ms Justice Mary Rose Gearty

Delivering judgment for the High Court, Ms Justice Mary Rose Gearty explained: “At its height, this is a case in which, as the Supreme Court recently described it, the litigant wants to choose his judge… Repeated applications for recusal do not accumulate to form evidence of bias, otherwise litigants could choose their judge by making groundless applications. Similarly, formal complaints do not create an apprehension of bias as, otherwise, frivolous complaints could force a judge to recuse herself…”

Background

The applicant sought leave to judicially review of decisions of the respondent District Court judge, who was hearing a family law case in which he was a party. 

In particular, the applicant suggested that the judge was biased and favoured his opponent’s counsel by handing her legislation during her application to lift the in camera rule, which application was being made to allow counsel to defend herself, by reference to the otherwise private details of the case, in a High Court action in which the applicant accused her of professional negligence.

The applicant sought leave to quash an order lifting the in camera rule and to quash the judge’s refusal to recuse herself. The applicant also sought orders inter alia preventing the judge from hearing future applications and compelling her to “produce an order” which would allow him to appeal her decision as to the in camera rule.

The High Court

Ms Justice Gearty considered that the applicant was seeking to judicially review a case in which he already had at least one appeal pending in the Circuit Court, noting that the Supreme Court in State (Roche) v Delap [1980] I.R. 170 refused to grant an order of certiorari in similar circumstances. 

However, given the claim of bias, the High Court agreed to consider the application as it was argued that judicial review was the more appropriate remedy in the case before her. 

Turning to the law on bias and leave applications, Ms Justice Gearty considered Kelly v U.C.D. [2025] IESC 6 and G v D.P.P. [1994] 1 I.R. 374, noting that the applicant was required to show that he had an arguable case, or some prospect of success in his argument that the District Court judge was biased and could not give the matter an impartial decision by reference only to the facts and law.

Having regard to the undesirability of calling evidence as to bias from judges, Ms Justice Gearty was satisfied that in the leave application before her “the evidence can be taken at its height and assessed on the basis of the applicant’s description alone”.

Having examined the applicant’s affidavit, the court was satisfied that at least three judges had made decisions with which the applicant did not agree, that the applicant had formally complained about two of those judges, and that after he asked the respondent to recuse herself, the respondent refused to adjourn an application and handed a copy of a statute to the barrister who was acting for his ex-wife but who was a party to that motion. The applicant had also previously complained about the respondent judge and she had revised her position to allow the applicant’s McKenzie friend to attend with him.

Ms Justice Gearty was not satisfied that this situation was one in which a reasonable observer, apprised of all the facts, would have a reasonable apprehension of bias, highlighting that while our adversarial system might suggest that a judge sits passively and makes a decision with the parties having put forward their cases, “that is far too simplistic a view of what happens in court. It is commonplace for judges to remind counsel and litigants of a case or a piece of legislation.”

The judge continued: “If there is a statute which governs a case and a litigant or lawyer has not cited it, there is no reason why a judge, familiar with the law, should not mention it or even hand a copy to a litigant or lawyer. This assistance is often granted to litigants in person, in particular, who are unfamiliar with court procedure. There is never a suggestion that this constitutes bias towards that litigant or amounts to an ominous sign that the court will not listen to the opposing side.”

Finding that the handing of a copy of a statute to a barrister was not linked with the outcome of the case save insofar as it ensured that the outcome would be in accordance with law, Ms Justice Gearty determined that the applicant could not succeed in obtaining leave for judicial review on that basis. 

The court further determined that the balance of the factual matrix as asserted by the applicant did not evidence any mala fides or bias on the respondent’s part.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the High Court refused the leave to seek judicial review of the District Court judge’s decision.

R.M. v Máire Conneely, Judge of the District Court [2025] IEHC 92