About this case:

• Citation:
  [2024] IEHC 384
• Judgment:
  External link
• Court:
  High Court
• Judge:
  Mr Justice Anthony Barr

Delivering judgment for the High Court, Mr Justice Anthony Barr confirmed that “a mere suspicion on the part of a party, or his legal advisers, that a person or entity may be responsible for the accident, is not sufficient to fix him with knowledge for the purposes of starting time to run against him under the 1991 Act” and was not satisfied “that the plaintiff’s former solicitor had anything like the required knowledge when he wrote the letters to the seven addressees on 5 December 2018”.

Ms Siún Leonowicz BL appeared for the plaintiff instructed by Charles B.W. Boyle & Son Solicitors, and Mr Frederick W Gilligan BL appeared for the third defendant instructed by Gleeson McGrath Baldwin Solicitors.

Background

On 16 January 2018, the plaintiff was crossing Luas tracks at the Milltown Luas stop when she was caused to trip and fall due to the allegedly unsafe and dangerous condition of the pedestrian crossing.

On 5 December 2018, a pre-litigation letter was sent by the plaintiff’s former solicitors to seven entities, including the third defendant, and a PIAB authorisation issued in respect of the seven entities on 23 July 2020. On 18 August 2020, a personal injuries summons issued against the first defendant only.

On 7 October 2021, the first defendant delivered a defence blaming the second defendant for the accident complained of, and the second defendant was subsequently joined to the proceedings. On 27 July 2022, the second defendant delivered a defence seeking to attribute liability for the accident to the third defendant, and on 29 July 2022, it sought to join the third defendant as a third party to the proceedings.

On 6 December 2022, the plaintiff commenced proceedings against the third defendant, Alstom Transport Ireland Ltd, by way of amended personal injuries summons. The third defendant applied to have the plaintiff’s claim as against it struck out on the basis that her action was statute-barred having regard to the Statute of Limitations 1957, as amended.

The plaintiff relied upon the Statute of Limitations (Amendment) Act 1991, contending that she only became aware that the third defendant was the entity responsible for the maintenance of the Luas pedestrian crossings only arose upon reading the second defendant’s affidavit grounding its application to join the third defendant to the proceedings as a third party and upon the delivery of the second defendant’s defence on or about 27 July 2022.

Submissions on behalf of the plaintiff and third defendant

On behalf of the third defendant, it was submitted that having regard to the pre-litigation letter sent by the plaintiff’s former solicitors and the PIAB authorisation against all seven entities, it could not be argued that the plaintiff’s date of knowledge of potential liability on part of the third defendant only arose in July 2022.

It was further contended that in line with O’Driscoll v Dublin Corporation [1999] 1 ILRM 106 and O’Sullivan v Ireland [2020] 1 IR 413, the plaintiff and her solicitors were obliged to make further enquiries as to the possible liability of the third defendant, and had that enquiry been made, the plaintiff would have acquired the relevant knowledge much earlier.

On behalf of the plaintiff, it was submitted that it was clear from the pre-litigation letter that the plaintiff’s former solicitor did not know which of the seven entities was responsible for the accident locus. It was further submitted that the plaintiff’s current solicitor had taken a more cautious approach by issuing proceedings against the entity he thought was most likely to be responsible for the maintenance of the accident locus, the first defendant.

The High Court

Mr Justice Barr considered the ‘date of knowledge’ provisions in s.2 of the 1991 Act, finding that he was not satisfied that the pre-litigation letters sent by the plaintiff’s former solicitors demonstrated that the plaintiff or her legal advisors had knowledge of the potential liability of any of the seven entities named therein.

In particular, the judge noted: “The fourth paragraph of that letter made it clear that the plaintiff and her legal advisers were in the dark as to what involvement, if any, any of the seven addressees may have had with the maintenance or repair of the locus at the time of the accident.”

The court agreed with the plaintiff that her former solicitors “had indeed adopted a wide scattergun approach in relation to the entities to whom such letters were addressed”, finding it “equally clear that such ‘understanding’ as they may have had in relation to what entity or entities may have been responsible for maintenance of the pedestrian crossings on the Luas tracks, was vague in the extreme”.

Mr Justice Barr was satisfied that at the pre-litigation stage, it was not “realistically feasible” for the plaintiff to have done much more than what had been done by her former solicitor, noting that when no reply to the pre-litigation letter was received from the third defendant or its insurers, the plaintiff “had little option but to proceed against whichever of the entities appeared to be the most likely entity to be responsible for the maintenance of the locus at the time of the accident. It would not have been possible for the plaintiff to have obtained discovery of documents prior to the commencement of litigation.”

The judge continued: “This meant that, in reality, the plaintiff was not aware of the existence of any contract between the second defendant and the third defendant, until she was specifically advised of the existence of such a contract in the defence filed on behalf of the second defendant and in the affidavit sworn by Ms Cassidy on 26 July 2022.”

The court also accepted the submission on behalf of the plaintiff that mere suspicion on part of a party or his legal advisers that a person or entity may be responsible for an accident is insufficient to fix him with knowledge for the purposes of starting the running of the statutory limitation period against him.

Mr Justice Barr was satisfied that the plaintiff’s date of knowledge in relation to the identity of the third defendant as a party potentially having responsibility for the maintenance of the accident locus did not arise until July 2022.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the High Court found that the plaintiff’s claim against the third defendant was not statute-barred and made orders inter alia dismissing the third defendant’s motion.

Anglade v Transdev Dublin Light Rail Limited & Ors [2024] IEHC 384