About this case:

• Citation:
  [2023] NICA 44
• Judgment:
  External link
• Court:
  NI Court of Appeal
• Judge:
  Mrs Justice Keegan

The coroner found that the survivor witness did not have sufficient grounds for the elevated status, as the inquiry’s fundamental purpose was to investigate the circumstances of the death, and not to investigate the injury.

Background

This was an appeal from a 2023 decision of Mr Justice Fowler, wherein he refused leave to apply for judicial review of a coronial decision to the effect that the appellant should not be afforded PIP status in the inquest before him.

A properly interested person is entitled to examine any witness at an inquest either in person or by counsel or solicitor. The inquest concerned the death of Seamus Patrick Dillon in 1997 outside the Glengannon Hotel in Cookstown, Co Tyrone.

The appellant was shot and paralysed in the same gun attack as Mr Dillon, his co-worker and close friend. Both men were providing security as doormen outside the hotel on the night in question. Whilst he survived the attack, he sustained life changing injuries, is paraplegic, and has reduced life expectancy.

The appellant argued that there were serious investigative failings into the attack. For example, the rifle used was used in other attacks where collusion could have played a role, and the RUC did not give a warning to the Glengannon Hotel unlike other premises.

The coroner’s rulings

The coroner issued two rulings in relation to the application. In the first, he noted that the appellant was a witness, so his contribution to the investigation, whilst important, was somewhat limited.

He reasoned: “In my view, the circumstances in which a survivor victim could successfully argue for PIP status in an inquest are for the most part confined to circumstances where there is evidence that the survivor victim is to be the potential subject of criticism or where there is evidence that the death occurred in circumstances where he was an intended target. Neither of these circumstances pertain on the facts of this case.”

He also considered whether his inclusion as a PIP would enhance the quality of the evidence in the inquest as a whole. He found that the focus must be on the circumstances of the death, and here there was no good reason to extend PIP to a survivor victim.

Following this ruling, the appellant made a renewed application. In the second ruling, the coroner noted that the circumstances by which a survivor comes to be injured may overlap with the circumstances of the deceased’s death, but the survivor’s injury is not the focus of the inquest.

Arguments on appeal

The appellant put forward three arguments on appeal, namely:

1. the coroner erred in law, by failing to apply the test of whether the appellant had a proper interest;
2. the coroner failed to have adequate regard to the fact that the appellant also had an Article 2 right to an investigation; and
3. the coroner made an irrational decision.

The coroner argued that the decision to decline PIP status was very carefully considered and it could not be said that he took into account an irrelevant matter or that his decision was unlawful.

The governing legal rules are the Coroners (Practice and Procedure) Rules (Northern Ireland) 1963, namely rule 7, which provides limited exceptions for certain trade union representatives, but “in every other case the coroner must make a specific assessment and determination”.

Consideration

The court first noted that no person has a right to conferral of PIP status under rule 7(1). They then considered legal authorities in this area.

In R v Coroner for the Southern District of Greater London ex parte Driscoll [1993] 159 JP 45, the English Divisional Court expressly declined any attempt to provide an exhaustive definition of the words “properly interested person”. The court agreed with this approach.

Driscoll also argued that the mere fact of being a witness will rarely be enough to merit PIP status, which the court also concurred with.

In R (Platts) v HM Coroner for South Yorkshire (East District) [2008] EWHC 2502, one issue was whether an ex-partner of the deceased could be a properly interested person under the rule. Ultimately, it was held that they were a properly interested person.

The court stressed that every case would be unavoidably fact-sensitive and context-sensitive. Therefore, it would be rare that a coroner could derive assistance from rulings made in previous cases. The court stressed that “such rulings do not have precedent status and practitioners should rarely base applications and submissions on them”.

Further, the court found no public law error. There was no suggestion that the coroner failed to have regard to statute, and the court found that he asked the relevant questions. The court also detected no misdirection in law.

The main considerations which he took into account were plainly material, and he left no material consideration out of account. The court also found that no semblance of irrationality was discernible. Finally, the court found that no fetter of discretion had been established.

Further, the court accepted that there was no dispute that Article 2 was engaged. However, they clarified that this inquest was not “the vehicle for discharging any state obligation, under Article 2 or otherwise, to inquire into the injuries sustained by the appellant”.

The inquest was not designed to fulfil this purpose; its fundamental purpose was to inquire into the death of Mr Dillon.

The appellant was injured, seriously so, in the attack which ended the life of Mr Dillon. However, this “coincidence” fell short of establishing a case for PIP status. The coroner’s conclusion to this effect was unimpeachable.

Conclusion

Ultimately, the court was in broad agreement with the coroner’s ruling and the judgment of Mr Justice Fowler. The grant of properly interested person status is pre-eminently a discretionary exercise. The outcome of every application will depend on the facts of the particular case.

The appeal was therefore dismissed.